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ABSTRACT
Traditional models of politician behavior predict complete or partial policy convergence, whereby
electoral competition compels partisan politicians to choose positions more moderate than their most-
preferred policies. Alternatively, if politicians cannot overcome the inability to make binding pre-
commitments to policies, the expected result is complete policy divergence. By exploiting a regression
discontinuity (RD) design inherent in the Congressional electoral system, this paper empirically tests the
strong predictions of the complete divergence hypothesis against the alternative of partial convergence
within the context of Representatives' roll call voting behavior in the U.S. House (1946-1994). The RD
design implies that which party wins a district seat is quasi-randomly assigned among elections that turn
out to be "close". We use this variation to examine if Representatives' roll call voting patterns do not
respond to large exogenous changes in the probability of winning the election, the strong prediction of
complete policy divergence. The evidence is more consistent with full divergence and less consistent with
partial convergence, suggestive that the difficulty of establishing credible commitments to policies is an
important real-world phenomenon.
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The central prediction of traditional models of electoral competition is that opposing politicians
and parties, in the attempt to capture the “moderate” vote, are compelled to moderate their policy positions.
The most well-known illustration of this notion is the result of the “median voter theorem” in the context of
two-party political competition (Hotelling (1929) and Downs (1957)), whereby parties are forced to choose
the same position. Most other models do not yield this stark prediction of complete convergence to the
median voter.1 But they still predict partial policy convergence, whereby competition compels opposing
sides to choose relatively more moderate positions than their respective “ideal” policies.2
On the other hand, as pointed out in Alesina (1988), any degree of policy convergence – whether
complete or partial – requires that political parties have the ability to make binding pre-commitments to
their announced positions, or to otherwise establish the credibility of their platforms (for example, via
reputational mechanisms). Without credible commitments to moderate policies, voters have no choice but
to expect that the party that wins the election will pursue its ex-post most-preferred policy. In this case,
electoral competition fails to compel policy moderation; the result is complete policy divergence (Alesina
1988).
Which of these two contrasting perspectives is more empirically relevant? Does competition for
moderate voters compel opposing politicians to moderate their policy positions to some degree? Or are
politicians unable to credibly commit to anything other than the extreme party-line position? Existing stud-
ies typically reject the strong notion of complete policy convergence (e.g. the “median voter theorem”
result).3 However, this leaves open the question of whether actual politicians’ behaviors are better char-
acterized by partial convergence or complete policy divergence. There is little empirical evidence on this
question, and hence little evidence on whether the credibility probleminthecontext oftwo-party policy for-
1 Developments along the lines of Hotelling (1929) and Downs (1957) include (but are not limited to) Hinich, Ledyard, and
Ordeshook (1972, 1973), McKelvey (1975), Wittman (1983), and Calvert (1985). Other examples of models that do not necessarily
lead to complete convergence include Wittman (1977) Aldrich (1983), Coleman (1972), Baron (1994), and Grossman and Helpman
(1996).
2 The literature is too large to be cited here. See Osborne (1995) for a nice review of variations of spatial competition under
plurality rule. Also see Persson and Tabellini (2000).
3 For example, Poole and Rosenthal (1984) show that senators from the same state but from different political parties have
different voting records. We discuss the existing literature in Section 5.
1mation is an important real-world phenomenon. The main empirical problem is that parties’ most-preferred
policy outcomes (hereafter referred to as their “bliss points”) are unobservable to the researcher.
This paper empirically tests the hypothesis of complete policy divergence against the alternative
of partial convergence in the context of explaining roll call voting patterns in the United States House of
Representatives. In particular, we test the strong implication of complete policy divergence that exogenous
shifts in the probability of a party winning the election in a particular district should have no impact on the
positions of the parties’ candidates for that district. Partial convergence (which is arguably more plausible
than full convergence), on the other hand, predicts that an exogenous increase in the relative popularity of
the Democrat’s (Republican’s) nominee in a particular district induces both candidates to adopt positions
closer to the Democrat’s (Republican’s) bliss point.
Ourtestisbasedonaregressiondiscontinuity(RD)analysisofaquasi-experimentthatisembedded
in the Congressional electoral system. That is, we argue that among elections that were decided by a very
narrow margin (say, by less than 1 percent of the vote), there is virtual random assignment of who – the
Republican or Democratic nominee – wins the election. The test is based on a comparison of sharp RD
and “fuzzy” RD (which we denote RD-IV) estimates of the degree of roll call voting divergence between
opposing candidates in the U.S. House.
If the regression discontinuity design is valid, then the average voting records of Republicans who
are barely elected will credibly represent, on average, how Republicans would have v o t e di nt h ed i s t r i c t s
that were in actuality, barely won by Democrats (and vice versa). The difference between barely-elected
Democrats’ records and barely-elected Republicans’ records – our benchmark regression discontinuity
(RD) estimator – represents a credible estimate of the average policy divergence between the two par-
ties across these districts. The RD estimator is consistent under both complete policy divergence and any
degree of policy convergence.
On the other hand, the RD-IV estimate of the same gap between opposing parties’ positions –
whereby we use, among close elections, who won the previous election as an instrument for which party
wins the current election – is consistent only under full policy divergence, and inconsistent under partial
2policy convergence. This is because under full policy divergence, the outcome of an election has an impact
on how the district’s representative votes in Congressional sessions following the subsequent election only
through its impact on which party wins the subsequent election – making the current election outcome
a valid instrument. By contrast, under partial policy convergence, a Democrat (Republican) victory in a
close election has an additional impact on the observed voting pattern of the district’s representative in the
subsequent Congressional session. By raising the probability of a Democratic (Republican) victory in the
next election, it causes both candidates to shift their positions toward the Democrat’s (Republican’s) bliss
point. Thus, as we show below, under partial policy convergence, the previous electoral outcome is not a
valid instrument. As a result, full divergence predicts that the RD and RD-IV estimates will be similar (and
consistent), and partial divergence predicts that they should be different.
Usingrollcall voting scoresforthe U.S. HouseofRepresentativesfrom1946to1995, we reportthe
following empirical results. First, we document that districts barely won by Democrats are similar to those
barely won by Republicans along many pre-determined characteristics of the voting population. This lends
credibility to the assumption upon which our analysis crucially rests: among closely-contested elections,
who ultimately wins the seat is “as-good-as” randomly assigned. Second, our RDestimates reject the notion
of full policy convergence, consistent with ﬁndings in the existing literature. We document that the degree
of policy divergence is quite signiﬁcant. In fact, barely-elected Democrats’ (Republicans’) voting records
are just as liberal (conservative) as those of their colleagues who won their seats by landslide victories.
Our primary empirical result is that RD and RD-IV estimates of the voting record gaps are quite
similar, and hence we fail to reject the strong, falsiﬁable prediction of the full policy divergence hypothesis.
W eu s es t a n d a r dm e a s u r e so fv o t i n gr e c o r d su s e di nt h el i t e r a t u r e( e . g .A D As c o r e s ) ,o u ro w nc o n s t r u c t e d
measure of loyalty to the party leadership using the individual vote tallies on every issue voted on in the
House, as well as other common political interest group voting scores (e.g. Chamber of Commerce, AFL-
CIO). All measures yield the qualitatively similar result. Furthermore, we conduct our analysis under two
different assumptions: ﬁrst, assuming that the policy gap between the two parties across all districts is the
3same, and second, allowing for unrestricted heterogeneity in the gap across districts.4 Both analyses point
to evidence less consistent with partial convergence, and more consistent with the full policy divergence
equilibrium.
Thus we ﬁnd little empirical support, in this context, for the notion that electoral competition com-
pels opposing candidates to moderate their policy positions – the central result of a large class of traditional
models of political competition. On the other hand, the ﬁndings of complete policy divergence are perfectly
consistent with the outcome that would occur if 1) politicians were unable to make credible commitments
(via reputational mechansims or otherwise) to moderate their positions and 2) voters are forward-looking
and have rational expectations – as suggested by Alesina (1988). We argue below that the U.S. House may
be one of the most likely contexts in which reputational mechanisms can work to sustain partial conver-
gence. Hence, the ﬁnding of “maximal” divergence in the context of voting in the U.S. House is suggestive
that the difﬁculty of establishing credible commitments to policies is an important real-world phenomenon.
Some recent models of representative democracy (e.g. Besley and Coate 1997, 1998) explicitly account for
this, and assume that politicians are unable to credibly commit ex ante to policies more moderate than their
ex post most-preferred policies. The evidence presented here provides empirical support for this modeling
assumption.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the basic results of Alesina (1988) model
of policy convergence. Section 3 describes inference problems encountered, and the strong predictions of
the the complete divergence hypothesis. Section 4 reports the main results of the paper. We ﬁr s tt e s tf o r
full convergence. Having rejected full convergence, we conduct our tests of complete policy divergence,
ﬁrst adopting the assumption of homogeneity across districts, and then under a more general heterogeneous
environment. We show that our results are robust to several alternative measures of roll call voting records.
Section5 discusses our ﬁndings in the contextofother empirical studieson policy convergence, and Section
4 We consider the heterogeneous case because it can be argued that the IV estimate estimates a local average treatment effect
(Imbensand Angrist, 1994)(see Hahn, Todd, andvan der Klauwwfor theanalogy of LATEin the case ofregressiondiscontinuities);
hence, a difference in the RD and RD-IV estimates could be due to the different populations for which the treatment effect is
estimated. However, as we show below, we can generate our RD benchmark estimate separately for the “always-takers”, “never-
takers” and “compliers” (Angrist, Imbens, and Rubin 1995). This is only possible because we actually observe the underlying index
that determines the treatment (which party wins the election).
46 concludes.
2 Background: Theory and Context
In this section, we 1) outline the theoretical framework that we directly implement in our empirical
analysis, and 2) discuss our choice of examining the context of roll call votes in the U.S. House.
2.1 Theoretical Framework
There are many ways in which the behavior of partisan politicians can be modeled (e.g. see Chapter
5 of Persson and Tabellini, 2000). However, we believe that the general framework of Alesina (1988)
most directly highlights the issue of credible commitments and the sustainability of policy convergence
via reputational mechansims. Furthermore, the model’s level of parsimony makes it empirically tractable,
and leads to testable implications. Since we adopt that framework, we begin by brieﬂy reviewing its key
features and the results that are most relevant to our analysis. Details of the model and justiﬁcations for its
assumptions are found in Alesina (1988).5
For a given Congressional district, there are two politicalparties, party 1 and party 2. Nodistinction
is made between the party and its nominee.6 Each party’s preferences are deﬁned over a single-dimensional













qt (lt − c2)
2
for party 1 and 2, respectively, with c1 >c 2 and 0 <q<1. lt is the chosen policy of the ofﬁceholder
following election t,a n dq is the per-election-cycle discount factor. These quadratic-loss functions imply
that party 1’s and 2’s most preferred policies are c1,a n dc2, respectively. They are party 1’s and 2’s “bliss
points”.
Electoral outcomes themselves are not ex ante deterministic, but rather are characterized by a prob-
5 For convenience to the interested reader, we also adopt identical notation to Alesina (1988).
6 Alesina and Spear (1988) develop a model in which politicians are considered ﬁnite-lived, while parties are considered inﬁnite-
lived. They show that in an overlapping-generations model, partially convergent equilibria are dynamically sustainable.
5ability function
Pt = P (xe
t,y e
t,δt) (2)
which denotes the probability that party 1 will win the district in election t. This function can be interpreted
as capturing voters’ own preferences regarding policy, and other characteristics of the parties.7 xe
t and ye
t
are the voters’ (assumed rational) expectations of the policy that party 1’s and 2’s candidate, respectively,
will adopt if elected. δt represents a non-policy determinant of this “vote production function”, and pa-
rameterizes the popularity of a party’s candidate, keeping expected positions constant.8 For example, it
could represent the extent to which legislative experience is valued by voters. Voters are forward-looking
and have rational expectations; that is, in equilibrium, their expectations of legislators’ actions are correct.
Thus, in the discussion below, it is assumed that in equilibrium party 1 chooses the policy xt = xe
t and
party 2 chooses yt = ye
t.
ThemostimportantassumptionregardingthefunctionP isthatacandidate’sprobabilityofwinning
the election rises, ceteris paribus, as her anticipated future policy choice moves “closer” to that of her
opponent.9 This captures the notion of the (probabilistic) electoral beneﬁt resulting from moving to the
“middle” in order to capture more of the vote.
An uncertain electoral outcome implies that the implemented policy is also uncertain. The welfare
of the party is assumed to be the expected utility
w1 = P (xt,y t,δt)U (xt)+( 1− P (xt,y t,δt))U (yt) (3)
w2 = P (xt,y t,δt)V (xt)+( 1− P (xt,y t,δt))V (yt)
for party 1 and 2, respectively.
The timing of elections is as follows. Before election t, candidates from each party announce
how they will act (how they will vote on roll call votes), if elected. Voters form expectations of how
each candidate will act immediately following the election. The election is held, and the winning party’s
7 See Alesina (1988) for a more detailed discussion of how the function can be derived from voters’ preferences.
8 Alesina (1988) does not use the notation δt, but refers to such a factor in the text (when discussing exogenous shifts in P),
considering how an exogenous increase in the popularity of a particular party will alter the Nash bargaining solution. We introduce
δt here to make the exposition clearer in a later section.
9 This is Assumption (iv) of Alesina (1988).
6candidate chooses a position (xt for party 1, and yt for party 2). The voters’ rational expectations of the
candidates’ choices turn out to be correct. The electoral cycle then repeats.
The key results from Alesina (1988) are:
1. The efﬁcient outcome is one where xt = yt – full convergence.10 Because of the concavity of the
preference functions, both parties prefer a moderate outcome with certainty to a “fair” bet.
2. In a one-period game, without the possibility of binding pre-commitments to policies, candidates’ an-
nouncements are not credible, and candidates, if elected, choose their bliss points, as expected by voters.
The basic problem is that once elected, candidates have every incentive to move to the most-preferred
policy, and face no recourse from deviating from an announced policy. Rational voters expect that and
vote accordingly. The inability of candidates to make binding pre-commitments leads to the complete
divergence result. Thus, policy convergence results require some way to overcome this inability to
pre-commit; otherwise the equilibria will be time-inconsistent. This equilibrium is inefﬁcient.
3. In a repeated-game context, fully convergent equilibria can be sustained as long as the discount factor is
sufﬁciently high. The proposed equilibrium is one in which parties agree to announcing, and carrying
out a moderate outcome if elected. The expectation is that if the legislator deviates from the announced
policy, the party (having lost its reputation) reverts to the bliss point forever, and the opposing party
would also revert to its bliss point. As long as the discounted threat of “punishment” outweighs the
short-term gains from “cheating”, the full convergence sub-game perfect equilibrium can be sustained.
4. Even when the fully-convergent equilibria cannot be sustained, as long as the discount factor is not
zero, partially convergent equilibria are still sustainable under the same kind of reputational mecha-
nism. That is, the electoral beneﬁt to capturing “middle voters” leads to both parties to moderate their
positions, which is Pareto superior (from the perspective of the parties) to the fully divergent one-shot
Nash outcome.
5. Inan inﬁnitelyrepeated gamecontext, ifdiscount factorsare sufﬁciently high, there are multiple equilib-
ria. Fully-convergent, “median-voter-type” equilibria are sustainable, as are partially convergent equi-
libria. In addition, the full policy divergence result also remains an equilibrium of the dynamic game.
The strong prediction of the full divergence equilibrium (xt = c1, yt = c2 for all t)i st h a ta n
exogenous change in the probability of a party winning the election should have no impact on the positions
taken by the two parties. Essentially, politicians are unable to overcome the credibility problem, and hence
parties always choose their bliss points irrespective of their relative popularity, because any move to the
middle is not credible. This is the central prediction on which we base our empirical test.
In order to assess the power of our test against alternative hypotheses, it is instructive to consider
how anexogenous changeinthe probability of winning wouldaffectpolicy positions under threealternative
cases.
10 By “efﬁcient”, Alesina (1988) refers exclusively to the welfare of the political parties, not the voters. We adopt his notion
here. See Besley and Coate (1997, 1998) for a detailed discussion of the notion of “efﬁciency” in models of representative
democracy.
7Case 1: Full Convergence. There is even a multiplicity of Pareto-optimal points on the fully-
convergent efﬁcient frontier. Alesina (1988) uses Nash bargaining to choose one point, and proves an intu-
itive result: the Nash-bargaining solution moves towards party 1’s bliss point with an exogenous increase
in party 1’s popularity. That is, ceteris paribus, the equilibrium xt = yt moves towards c1 in response to an
increase in Pt. The intuition is that party 1’s bargaining position is strengthened by an exogenous increase
in its popularity.
Case 2: Partial Convergence; binding pre-commitments possible. A similar intuitive compar-
ative static holds even in the one-shot Nash Equilibrium with binding pre-commitments to policies. The
static game does not yield full convergence or full divergence, but does yield partial convergence (Calvert
1985, Alesina 1988). We show in the Appendix that, under some regularity conditions, the model predicts
that an exogenous increase in the relative popularity of party 1 (party 2) results in the equilibrium moving
towards party 1’s (party 2’s) bliss point.
Case 3: Partial Convergence; binding pre-commitments not possible. A similar comparative
static for the partially convergent case supported by reputation has not been established, although Alesina
(1988) proves existence of such sustainable partially convergent equilibria, when q>0.H o w e v e r ,s i n c e
the constraintsofindividualrationality and sub-gameperfectionboth explicitlydepend upon theprobability
that a party wins the election, one would expect the equilibrium policy positions of both parties to move
in response to a large exogenous change in the relative odds of winning the election. It is important to
note that in this case, if c1 and c2 are unquantiﬁable/unobservable to the researcher and if there is no clear
theoretical prediction about whatdirectionan exogenous increase inPt would impact equilibrium positions,
then the notion of partialconvergence has no empirical content. This is because in this parsimonious model,
there are only 3 exogenous factors, c1, c2,a n dδ. Without a comparative static result for a change in δ,t h e
partially convergent and fully divergent equilibria would be empirically indistinguishable, even though they
have signiﬁcantly different welfare implications.
In light of Case 3, the ﬁnding that candidates do not respond to changes in the probability of win-
ning would be consistent with both full divergence and partial convergence if the nature of the partially
8convergent equilibrium was such that there was no systematic effect of a change on the probability of win-
ning on the candidates’ positions. However, if the partially convergent equilibrium is unresponsive to such
exogenous changes in probabilities, then there would be no empirical content to the partially convergent
hypothesis. Thus, we believe it reasonable to stipulate that even in Case 3, any meaningful notion of partial
convergence would require that an exogenous change in the relative popularities of the two parties will
cause the equilibrium positions to move in some direction. In particular – in light of the comparative static
in Case 2, which mirrors the comparative static of Case 1 – one might expect that an exogenous increase in
the relative popularity of party 1 to move the equilibrium towards party 1’s bliss point.
2.2 Context: Roll Call Votes in the U.S. House
Given the wide range of possible equilibria, it would be informative to obtain evidence on which of the
three types of equilibria is most empirically relevant for describing the policy formation mechanism in a
major, long-standing representative democracy, such as the United States. In particular, we believe that the
U.S. House of Representatives is an ideal context for testing full policy divergence against the alternative
of partial convergence for a number of reasons.
First, the U.S. federal legislative body is virtually a two-party system, and the notion of policy
convergence is frequently modeled in a two-party context. When there are more than two candidates,
the basic insight of the Hotelling (1929) and Downs (1957) approach to policy convergence is somewhat
weakened (see Osborne 1995). Furthermore, it is widely accepted that Democrats and Republicans have
different (and often directly opposing) “ideal” policy positions. Indeed, existing empirical studies show that
party afﬁliation is one of the strongest predictors of roll call voting patterns.11 Therefore, it is meaningful
to ask whether electoral competition compels opposing parties’ nominees to moderate their positions in
the face of strong incentives to vote along party lines. If the U.S. House were a relatively non-partisan
environment (with “bliss points” relatively close together), the distinction between full policy divergence
and partial convergence would be less important, and a test to distinguish between them less useful.
Second, elections to the U.S. House are of the plurality/winner-take-all type. The election yields
11 See Section 5.
9one distinct legislator, who in principle, represents the interests of that district. This exactly matches the
theoretical framework described above. By contrast, examining the U.S. Senate – where there are two
representatives for each state – would be less appropriate given the theoretical framework that we adopt.
Furthermore, in the U.S. House, electoralcompetition occurs separately ateach Congressional district. This
more closely matches the conceptual framework described above, compared to, for example, proportional
representation systems, whereby seats are allocated in proportion to the national vote.
Third, there are reasons why reputational mechanisms are more likely to be relevant for elections
to the U.S. House, compared to elections to other political ofﬁces. U.S. House elections are held every
two years, and there are no term limits (as opposed to gubernatorial and presidential elections), meaning
that political careers can consist of several terms in ofﬁce. Furthermore, political tenure in the House is
often a stepping-stone to participating in electoral races for higher ofﬁces. For these reasons, it is plausible
that candidates for the U.S. House have high discount factors, which allows reputation to support partially
convergent equilibria. The conjecture that candidates have high discount factors is perhaps less supportable
in other political environments, with longer election cycles (e.g. the Senate) or term-limits (e.g. U.S.
Presidency or Governorship in the states with term-limits).
Our empirical tests focus on Representatives’ voting records. On the one hand, quantifying how
representatives vote requires a certain degree of subjectivity, and it is difﬁcult to associate monetary values
toparticularvotes. On theother hand, the“ideal”measures–individualcandidates’positionsontax ratesor
expenditure levels – are strictly unobservable to the researcher. Representatives’ roll call votes are directly
observable, and are part of the public record, implying that in principle, voters can compare a legislator’s
record to their platforms and promises as candidates (and opponents can advertise any deviations during
election campaigns). Convergent equilibria of the kind described in Alesina (1988) requires that policy
positions are perfectly observable by voters and that it can be determined whether politicians deviate from
those policy positions.
Finally, the examination of close votes is particularly appropriate in this context. Our main moti-
vation for examining close elections is that such an analysis isolates “near-random” assignment of which
10party wins the seat. But an added beneﬁt from this focus is that moderation of policy positions is more
likely to occur in “moderate” districts – where there is roughly equal probability of each party winning the
election (Alesina 1988).
In sum, we believe that the context of roll call voting behavior of representatives who were barely
elected to the U.S. House is an ideal setting to test full policy divergence against partial convergence be-
cause: 1) the degree of partisanship in the U.S. House implies that there is a meaningful difference between
the two types of equilibria, and 2) based on the theoretical framework reviewed in the previous section,
there are many reasons to believe that reputational mechanisms would be able to sustain some degree of
policy convergence between opposing candidates in the U.S. House.
3 Empirical Problems and Implications
In this section, we describe two empirical problems which stand in the way of empirically distin-
guishing between fully convergent, partially convergent, and fully divergent equilibria. We then describe
how we use a regression discontinuity design to address these problems.
3.1 Unobservable policy positions and bliss points
The ﬁrst important problem is that although the announced and expected positions of both opposing candi-
dates are known to voters in each district, as researchers, we can only systematically measure the actions of
the legislator. More speciﬁcally, in our analysis, we focus on the roll call voting behavior of the legislator,
which we can observe and quantify. But we do not observe and cannot quantify what the losing candidate’s
roll call voting behavior would have been, had he won the election instead.
More formally, adding the subscript i to denote the Congressional district, we only observe
RCit =
½
xit if party 1 wins election t
yit if party 2 wins election t (4)
which can be equivalently written as
RCit = yit + DEMit (xit − yit) (5)
where RCit is a measure of district i’s legislator’s roll call voting behavior – for example, how liberal
11the voting record is – in the Congressional session that follows election t. DEMit =1i fp a r t y1( e . g .
Democrats) wins election t in district i,a n d0 if party 2 (e.g. Republicans) prevails. As researchers, we
cannot measure both positions simultaneously, so it is impossible to know, for a particular district, if xit
equals (e.g. full convergence) or substantially deviates (e.g. full divergence) from yit.
The second problem is that it is difﬁcult to obtain credible measures of the bliss points of parties
in any given district (denote the district-time-speciﬁc bliss points for party 1 and 2 as c1it and c2it, respec-
tively).12 This makes it impossible to assess whether or not xit = c1it (yit = c2it), which is, by deﬁnition,
what differentiates a partially convergent equilibrium from the fully divergent case.
Existing empirical studies implicitly or explicitly estimate a speciﬁcation in the form of 5: a re-
gression of RCit (ADA scores for the House Representative) on some proxy for voters’ “preferences” (e.g.
the Democratic presidential vote share in the district as a measure of how liberal the district is) and the
dummy variable DEMit. It is clear from Equation 5 that as long as the measure for preferences is an
adequate measure for yit, and which party wins the seat (DEMit) is independent of those preferences, the
full convergence hypothesis – E [xit − yit]=0– can be tested by examining the coefﬁcient on the party
afﬁliation, DEMit. Indeed, the existing literature ﬁnds evidence strongly inconsistent with the full policy
convergence hypothesis.13
On the other hand, this regression approach cannot differentiate between full policy divergence
and some degree of policy convergence. In particular, the regression coefﬁcient on DEMit – E [xit − yit]
– can either be equal to E [c1it − c2it] (full divergence), or be much smaller than E [c1it − c2it] (partial
convergence). The coefﬁcient on the proxy for voters’ preferences is not informative about the degree of
partial convergence; ratherit indicateswhetherthedistrict-speciﬁc“blisspoints” ofthe parties, c1it and c2it,
are larger – more liberal – if the proxy for “liberalness” is higher, which we might expect when examining
the cross-section of Congressional districts. That is, we might expect that the bliss point for a Republican
nominee in Massachusetts would be relatively more “liberal’ compared to bliss point for a Republican
12 For example, leaders of Democrats in Alabama may have ideal positions quite different from the Democratic leadership in
Massachusetts.
13 For a discussion of empirical regularities in the literature, see Snyder and Ting (2001a).
12nominee in Texas.
3.2 Identiﬁcation Strategy: RD versus RD-IV Estimates
3.2.1 Benchmark RD Estimate
Our test of full divergence against the alternative of (partial or full) policy convergence is based on the com-
p a r i s o nb e t w e e ns h a r pr e g r e s s i o nd i s c o n t i n u i t y( R D )a n df u z z yR D( w h i c hw er e f e rt oa sR D - I V )e s t i m a t e s
of the degree of policy divergence between candidates of opposing parties, averaged across Congressional
districts.
We begin by showing how a regression discontinuity (RD) design inherent in the electoral system
directly addresses the ﬁrst empiricalproblemdiscussed above. In particular, we argue thatdistricts in which
candidates for party 1 (e.g. Democrats) are barely elected (say, by a tiny fraction of the vote) are ex ante
similar to districts in which candidates for party 2 (e.g. Republicans) are barely elected. In particular,
if the regression discontinuity design is valid, the two groups of districts would be similar, along all pre-
determined characteristics, including the voters’ preferences, and the parties’ district-speciﬁc bliss points.
This virtual “random assignment” of which party wins a close election implies that the average voting
records of Republicans that are barely elected can credibly represent, on average, how Republicans would
have voted in the districts that were in reality, barely won by Democrats (and vice versa).
To see how the regression discontinuity design addresses the inference problem, ﬁrst note that we
can express Pit = P (xe
it,ye
it,δit) in terms of the vote share for party 1 (Democrats):
VS it = vs(xe
it,ye
it,δit,εit) (6)
where εit is an unpredictable and unforecastable component of the vote share that is independent of all
other factors. This could be interpreted as turn-out on voting day, or errors in polls, etc.14 vs is a contin-
uously differentiable function, and the framework presented in the previous section implies that the partial
derivatives have the following signs: vs1 < 0,vs 2 < 0;w en o r m a l i z evs3 > 0 and vs4 > 0. In a two-party
system, DEMit =1if and only if VS it > 1
2.
14 The existence of this component is equivalent to Alesina’s (1988) maintained assumption that electoral outcomes are uncertain.
13In any equilibrium (full divergence, partial convergence, or complete convergence), the positions of
candidates in district i for election t are completely determined by the bliss points and the voting production
function, so that xit = mx (c1it,c 2it,δit) and yit = my (c1it,c 2it,δit). We assume throughout that mx and
my are continuously differentiable with respect to their arguments.
The simple difference between the voting records of Democratic and Republican legislators is un-
informative about the full policy convergence hypothesis. This is because
E [RCit|DEMit =1 ]− E [RCit|DEMit =0 ] (7)
= E
·











There is potential for serious selection bias, as c1it, c2it,a n dδit all help determine VS it, and hence the
outcome of the election. Intuitively, the districts that were won by Democrats are likely to be systematically
different from those won by Republicans. In particular, it is plausible (and likely) that voters in districts
won by Democrats are, on average, more liberal than voters in districts won by Republicans; it is also
plausible that both parties’ bliss points are more liberal in relatively more liberal districts. The source of
the problem is that the distribution of c1it, c2it,a n dδit within Democratic-won districts is quite likely to be
very different from that within Republican-won districts.
Under a mild continuity assumption, if the attention is restricted to elections where the vote share
margin of victory is slim, the Democrat and Republican districts will become arbitrarily similar in the
distribution of these quantities.
Proposition 1 If c1it, c2it, δit,a n dεit have continuous joint density, then the density of c1it, c2it, and δit
conditional on VS it = 1
2 + ∆ equals the density conditional on VS it = 1
2 − ∆ in the limit, as ∆ → 0.
This is an important result for the empirical analysis in the paper, which focuses on the comparison
of barely-elected Democrat and Republican districts. Essentially, it implies that when examining “close”
elections, there is “as-good-as” random assignment of which party ultimately wins. In the closest of elec-
tions (e.g. decided by 1 vote), which party wins is determined as if by the ﬂip of a coin. This will result
in the bare-Democrat and bare-Republican districts being on average similar in all the characteristics that





























for ∆ sufﬁciently small.
So this regression discontinuity (RD) estimand – the comparison of voting patterns between barely-
electedDemocratsandbarely-electedRepublicans–shouldequaltheaveragedifferenceinpoliciesbetween
opposing candidates in those districts. Under full policy convergence, this quantity should be zero. Under
full divergence, it is E
£
c1it − c2it|VS it = 1
2
¤
, and under partial convergence, the RD estimand is less than
E
£
c1it − c2it|VS it = 1
2
¤
, but greater than zero. Most importantly, the quantity E
£




consistently estimated by the RD gap under full convergence, partial divergence, and full divergence.
3.2.2 Differentiating between Complete Divergence and Partial Convergence
The bliss points c1it and c2it are not easily measured by the researcher, which makes a simplistic test
of full policy divergence – a comparison between E
£









infeasible. However, as mentioned in Section 2 the theoretical framework generates a strong prediction
for the full policy divergence hypothesis. Speciﬁcally, in the fully divergent equilibria (where xit = c1it
and yit = c2it) an exogenous change in the probability of a Democrat (Republican) victory should not
cause a change in the parties’ positions, because those policy positions are completely determined by the
exogenously determined “bliss points”. An exogenous change in the relative popularity of a party in any
given district should only have the effect of altering the relative odds of whether party 1’s or 2’s bliss point
is ultimately chosen. Formally, the partial derivatives mx
3 = m
y
3 =0 ,b u tvs3 > 0.
And as mentioned above, this stark prediction does not hold for the fully convergent or partially
convergent equilibrium. For Case 1 and Case 2, mx
3 > 0,a n dm
y
3 > 0. And as argued earlier, given that
researchers cannot observe c1it and c2it, any meaningful notion of partial convergence in Case 3 requires
that mx
3 6=0 , m
y
3 6=0 .
15In our analysis, we use the notion that party incumbency causes an exogenous increase in the
probability of winning the subsequent election for testing the full divergence hypothesis. Lee (2001, 2002)
















represents a valid estimate of the causal party incumbency effect. Lee (2001, 2002) ﬁnds that, winning an
election causes an increase in the probability that the party will win the next election as much as 0.45.
Thus, our test of full divergence amounts to assessing whether the party winning an election – by
causing it have a greater probability of winning the next election – causes it to change its policy position
for the next election, all else equal. The regression discontinuity design is helpful here because it arguably
generates as-good-as randomized variation in whether or not a party wins an election, and hence keeps all
else equal (on average).
Proposition 2 If DEMit−1 has an average causal effect on DEMit (there exists a true electoral advan-
tage to party incumbency) then DEMit−1 has an impact on δit.
This follows immediately from the fact that DEMit is a known, deterministic function (DEMit =
1 i fa n do n l yi fVS it > 1
2)o fVS it , so anything that causally effects DEMit must do so by impacting VS it.
With the theoretical framework of Section 2, the equilibrium values of VS it are completely determined by
c1it,c 2it, δit, and εit. Bliss points are exogenously determined, and εit is assumed to be the unpredictable
component that generates the uncertain electoral outcome; hence DEMit−1 must induce an impact on
DEMit through effecting δit.
While there are many interpretations of what δit could represent, one concrete example is that it
represents the voters’ (independent from any partisan preferences) valuation of experience in Congress.
With this interpretation, an incumbent party has a higher probability of winning the seat again because the
expected experience level of its candidate will be higher than the expected challenger (Lee 2001).
Test under Homogeneity Before turning to a more general model with unrestricted heterogeneity, we
illustrate the basic intuition of the test by starting with the simplifying assumption that the difference be-
16tween opposing parties’ positions is constant across districts. In other words, even though xit, yit varies
across districts, x1it − y2it = k0 is constant across districts.
Proposition 3 Under homogeneity, if 1) whether or not a Democrat held the seat in election t − 1
(DEMit−1) is as-good-as randomly assigned, and 2) DEMit−1 has a nonzero impact on DEMit, then
only the complete divergence hypothesis implies that DEMit−1 is a valid instrument for estimating k0,
the impact of DEMit on RCit. If the complete divergence hypothesis is not true DEMit−1 is not a valid
instrument.
To see this, note that Equation 5 can be re-written as
RCit = my (c1it,c 2it,δit)+DEMitk0 (10)
Under the hypothesis of complete divergence my (c1it,c 2it,δit)=ci2t. As mentioned earlier, the blisspoint
c2it is exogenously determined, so DEMit−1 has no impact on c2it. Therefore, if DEMit−1 is as good as
randomlyassigned, and has an effectonDEMit, thenDEMit−1 would be a valid instrument for estimating
k0, the causal impact of DEMit on RCit. On the other hand, under full or partial convergence, m
y
3 6=0 ,
and more likely m
y
3 > 0.S oa sDEMit−1 impacts δit, it will affect the equilibrium policy positions of both
candidates, which would mean that DEMit−1 would not be a valid instrument for DEMit in the above
equation.
We have already argued that the ﬁrst condition of the above proposition holds (see Proposition 1)
if we restrict our attention to close elections in period t−1, and Lee (2001, 2002) provides strong evidence
that the second condition holds (and we present some of that evidence in this paper). Using Proposition 1, it










2−∆] is approximately equal to
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Under complete divergence (and homogeneity), the ﬁrst term is zero, so the RD-IV estimate equals
k0, which is also consistently estimated by the sharp regression discontinuity (RD) estimator in Equation 8.
By contrast, if complete divergence does not hold, the ﬁrst term is not zero, and hence the RD-IV estimator
15 For a recent formalization of the use of the regression discontinuity design to estimate causal effects, see Hahn, Todd, and van
der Klaauw (2001).
17will not be consistent for k0, and the RD-IV and RD estimates will differ.
Thus, our empirical test is based on assessing whether an exogenous change in the probability of a
party winning the seat affects how the representative in that district votes after the next election. If the only
effect is through impacting the relative odds of which party’s position is implemented, the data are more
consistent with full policy divergence. On the other hand, if there is an additional effect on the candidates’
positions, the data would be more consistent with some degree of policy convergence.
In our empirical analysis, we show that condition 1) and 2) in the above proposition is strongly
supported by the data. Therefore, a substantial difference between the RD and RD-IV estimates constitutes
a rejection of the complete divergence hypothesis in favor of the alternative of partial convergence.
Test under Heterogeneity The basic intuition of our test holds under a more general model where
yit − xit is allowed to vary across districts, after some care is taken in the interpretation of the RD-IV
estimand. In the discussion that follows, assume that we have conditioned on the districts involved in
close elections in t − 1, 1
2 − ∆ <VS it−1 < 1
2 + ∆, with ∆ small. We denote E∆ as the expectation
conditional on these close elections in t − 1. Note that among this group of districts, the average causal











is a weighted average of the causal effects for three sub-populations16:
E∆
£




















E∆ [xit|DEMit−1 =1 ,SWING t] − E∆ [yit|DEMit−1 =0 ,SWING t] (14)
The ﬁrst expression represents the average effect of DEMit−1 on the Democrats’ positions for
the sub-population of Democrats (STRONGDEM
t ) who would have won the election in period t irrespec-
tive of DEMit−1. The second expression is the analogous effect for the sub-population of Republicans
16 This assumes a monotonicity condition – incumbency cannot have a negative impact on the probability of election. See Hahn,
Todd, and van der Klauuw (2000), which discusses the regression discontinuity design analogy to the local average treatment effect
(LATE) of Imbens and Angrist (1994).
18(STRONGREP
t ) who would have won election t irrespective of DEMit−1.T h e ﬁnal expression is the
effect among the sub-population of districts (SWINGt) that switched from Democratic to Republican
control because of the incumbency advantage enjoyed by the Democrats in period t − 1 (DEMt−1). In
the terminology of Angrist, Imbens, and Rubin (1996), the expressions represent the causal effects for the
“always-takers”, “never-takers” and “compliers”, respectively.
There are two main implications of the complete divergence hypothesis – where positions are equal
to pre-determined bliss points – when allowing for more general heterogeneity:
1. the ﬁrst two effects should be zero; this is testable insofar the two effects can be estimated with data.
2. the third effect should be positive and equal to E∆ [c1it − c2it|SWINGt]. Strictly speaking, this is an
untestable implication. The effect in Equation 14 can be estimated, but it will not be known whether
it equals E∆ [c1it − c2it|SWINGt] given that c1it and c2it are unobservable to the researcher. How-
ever, in a relatively stationary environment, a good approximation to E∆ [c1it − c2it|SWINGt] would
be E∆ [c1it−1 − c2it−1|SWINGt],w h i c hcan be independently estimated. Under stationarity, a sub-
stantial departure between estimates of the two quantities constitutes a rejection of the full divergence
hypothesis.
Normally, with one instrument and one endogenous regressor, it is impossible to identify the three
sub-populationsdescribedabove, andhenceestimationofexpressions12, 13, and14isinfeasible. However,
in this particular context of elections, we can actually construct ﬁrst-order approximations to these sub-
populations in the data, because we observe the index VS it which perfectly determines DEMit.
Proposition 4 Conditioning on the districts involved in close elections in t − 1, 1
2 − ∆ <V S it−1 <
1
2 + ∆, with ∆ small, there exist θ1 and θ2 such that the three sub-populations can be, to the ﬁrst-order,
approximated as follows:
STRONGDEM
t if DEMit−1 =0 ,DEM it =1





t if DEMit−1 =1 ,DEM it =0




SWINGt if DEMit−1 =0 ,
1
2
− θ2 <VS it <
1
2







where θ1 and θ2 are implicitly deﬁned by Pr[VS it > 1
2 + θ1|DEMit−1 =1 ] =P r [ DEMit =1 |
DEMit−1 =0 ]and Pr[VS it < 1
2 − θ2| DEMit−1 =0 ]=P r [ DEMit =0 | DEMit−1 =1 ] .
Thus, our testing procedure amounts to estimating the causal effects 12, 13, and 14 by dividing our
19sample of close elections in period t−1 into STRONGDEM
t , STRONGREP
t ,a n dSWINGt groups, and
estimatingthemeandifferenceinrollcallvotes(RCit)betweenDemocratandRepublican districtsinperiod
t − 1 (by DEMit−1) ,f o re a c hg r o u p ,r e s p e c t i v e l y .I fe i t h e r1 )t h eﬁrst two effects substantially differ from
zero, or 2) the third effect signiﬁcantly departs from the benchmark E∆ [xit−1|DEMit−1 =1 ,SWING t]
− E∆ [yit−1|DEMit−1 =0 ,SWING t] ≈ E [c1it−1 − c2it−1|SWINGt], we reject the complete diver-
gence hypothesis in favor of the partial convergence equilibrium.
4 Empirical Analysis
4.1 Data Description: Roll Call Voting Records in the U.S. House
We begin by discussing the choice of the dependent variable. There are several alternative ways to mea-
sure politicians’ “behavior” in voting on legislation. A widely used measure is a voting score created by
the liberal political organization, Americans for Democratic Action (ADA). For each Congress, the ADA
chooses about 20 high-proﬁle roll call votes for the creation of an index that varies between 0 and 100 for
each Representative of the House and member of the Senate. Higher scores correspond to a more “liberal”
voting record. Throughout the paper, our preferred index of roll call votes is represented by ADA scores,
although we show below that our results are robust to alternative interest groups scores and other voting
record indices.
We utilize data on ADA scores for all Representatives in the U.S. House from 1946-1995, linked
to election returns data during that period.17 There is considerable variation in ADA scores within each
party. This is illustrated in Figure 1, which provides the distribution of ADA scores for Democrat and
Republican U.S. House of Representatives in the three most recent Congresses. To make the comparison
across congresses possible, we follow the literature and use “adjusted” ADA scores throughout the paper.18
The ﬁgure shows signiﬁcant overlapping in ADA scores between the parties, and it is not uncommon for
Democrat representatives to vote more conservatively than Republican candidates, and vice versa.
17 The data on roll call votes are from ICPSR 4. Data on electoral outcomes are from ICPSR 6311.
18 This adjustment to the nominal ADA score, was devised by Groseclose, Snyder and Levitt (1999). While nominal ADA scores
are between 0 and 100, “adjusted” ADA scores may be negative.
20One advantage of using ADA scores is that it is a widely used index in the literature. However, one
limitation is that it includes only 20 votes per legislature, and the choice of what roll call vote to include
a n dw h a tw e i g h tt oa s s i g nt oe a c hi s s u ei sn e c e s s a r i l ya r b i t r a r y . 19 To assess how robust our results are to
alternative measure of “liberalness” of roll call votes, have re-estimated all our models using four alternative
sets of voting record measures.
First, we use the DW-NOMINATE scores constructed by McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal (1997).
Poole and Rosenthal developed the NOMINATE procedure to estimate a low-dimensional measure of po-
litical ideology in a complex multidimensional political world. NOMINATE is an attempt to estimate the
underlying ideology that drives observed roll call behavior by assigning legislators the ideological points
that maximize the number of correctly predicted roll-call votes. Poole and Rosenthal noted that a single
dimension would be unlikely to capture the division between Northern and Sourthern Democrats during the
Civil Rights Era. Therefore, the NOMINATE procedure estimates a two-dimensional measure of ideology
where the ﬁrst dimension captures party loyalty and can be thought of as a liberal to conservative scale
and the second dimension captures the issues of race that divided the Democrats until the mid-1970s. The
NOMINATE procedure has the advantage of including all roll-call votes, not an arbitrary subset of votes.
It also ignores the representative’s political party and the legislative issue in question so it is arguably more
exogeneous than the ADA Scores. To simplify the analysis, and to remain consistent with our discussion
of a single ideological dimension, we restrict our analysis to the ﬁrst dimension during the period where
the second dimension had little predictive power. Speciﬁcally, we restrict our DW-NOMINATE analysis to
1975 and beyond.20
Second, for each member and each Congress, we construct our own measure of loyalty to the party
leadership using the individual vote tallies on every issue voted on in the House. For this measure, we
19 Another disadvantage is that the choice of which vote to include is made at the end of the legislature, not at the beginning. (At
the beginning of a legislature it is not obvious exactly which roll call will take place during a legislature.) This fact that the choice
is made ex-post raises the possibility that the criteria used to assign ADA scores could be somewhat endogenous.
20 We use the DW-NOMINATE scores as opposed to the Poole and Rosenthal’s earlier D-NOMINATE scores because the DW
data covers up through the 106th Congress while the D-NOMINATE data ends with the 99th Congress. The choice of the DW-
NOMINATE data is unlikely to affect our results since McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal note that the D-NOMINATE and DW-
NOMINATE scores are highly correlated where both scores are available. See Poole and Rosenthal (1997) for a description of the
NOMINATE procedure. Poole’s (1999) rank order data yields similar results.
21calculate the percent of a representative’s votes that agree with the Democrat party leader.21
Third, we use ratings from interest groups other than the ADA. We include both liberal and conser-
vative ratings from groups such as the American Civil Liberties Union, the League of Women Voters, the
League of Conservation Voters, the American Federation of Government Employees, the American Feder-
ation of State, County, Municipal Employees, the American Federation of Teachers, the AFL-CIO Building
and Construction, the United Auto Workers, the Conservative Coalition, the US Chamber of Commerce,
the American Conservative Union, the Christian Voters Victory Fund, the Christian Voice, Lower Federal
Spending, and Taxation with Representation. Not all the ratings are available in all years, so sample sizes
vary when using these alternative ratings.
A legitimate concern is that the interest group may choose the criteria used to calculate their rat-
ings based on partisan considerations. This could happen if partisan considerations enter interest groups
decisions on which votes to include in the ratings, or the weight assigned to each vote. If this is the case,
our ﬁnding could overstate the coefﬁcient on party afﬁliation. Given that we use ratings from 15 different
interest groups that are likely to use completely different criteria to create their ratings, we do not expect
this to be a major problem.
However, we address this concern directly by creating our own ratings using roll call votes on
abortion. We choose abortion because the classiﬁcation of votes as pro-life or pro-choice is straightforward
in most cases. For the three most recent Congresses for which we have data (102th to 104th), we identify
all roll call votes that contain the word “abortion” in the title or the description, and assign each candidate
a zero if the candidate voted pro-life and one if the candidate voted pro-choice. We then calculate the
percentage of pro-choice votes for each candidate. Such an index is more objective than the interest group
ratings, because it includes all votes on a speciﬁc issue, not just a selected sample, and assigns equal weight
to all votes, not arbitrary weights.
As we show below, the qualitative results of our estimation are remarkably stable across alternative
measures of roll call votes. This ﬁnding lends some credibility to the conclusion that our estimates are
21 The results are nearly identical if one uses the party whip instead of the party leader.
22not driven by the unique characteristics of one particular measure. See the Data Appendix for a detailed
discussion of our samples and data sources.
4.2 Graphical Analysis and Tests for Quasi-random Assignment
In the remainder of this section we use the framework described in Section 3 to distinguish between full
convergence, partial convergence and full divergence. We address the issues of unobserved parties’ and
legislators’ preferences by using a regression discontinuity analysis based on close elections. We compare
the roll call behavior of representatives from districts where the two-party vote share for the Democratic
candidate is just below 50% with the roll call behavior of representatives from districts where the vote share
for the Democratic candidate is just above 50%.
We begin by empirically illustrating the discontinuity around the 50% threshold. We present two
speciﬁcation tests that lend some support to our assumption that close elections provide as-good-as ran-
domized variation in party control of a seat. We then turn to the main results of the paper. First, we test
for full convergence using ADA scores as a measure of roll call records. Having rejected full convergence
– consistent with the ﬁndings of existing empirical studies – we then examine whether the data are more
consistent with either complete divergence or partial convergence. We do this ﬁrst under the assumption
of homogeneity, and then under the more general assumption of heterogeneity. Finally, we show that our
results do not change when we use alternative measures of roll call votes.
The top panel of Figure 2 plots ADA scores against the Democrat vote share. Data are for years
1946 to 1995. Throughout the paper, the unit of observation is the district at a given point in time. But to
give a general picture of the data, each point in Figure 2 is an average of the ADA score within 0.01-wide
intervals of the vote share. The vertical line marks 50% of the two-party vote share. Districts to the right
of the vertical line are Democrat, districts to the left are Republican. The continuous line in Figure 2 is
the predicted ADA scores from a regression that includes a 4th-order polynomial in vote share. A striking
feature of the ﬁgure is that ADA scores appear to be a continuous and smooth function of vote shares
everywhere, except at the threshold that determines party membership. There is a large discontinuous jump
23in ADA scores at the 50% threshold, indicating that representatives from districts with similar vote shares
have very different roll call behavior depending on the party to which they belong.22
Compare a district where the Democrat candidate barely lost (for example, vote share is 49%),
with a district where the Democrat candidate barely won, (for example, vote share is 51%). As argued in
Section 3, under the hypothesis of full convergence, we should observe little difference around the 50%
threshold. On the contrary, it seems that representatives from districts with almost identical vote shares
have widely different roll call records. The difference at the 50% threshold appears quite large. From the
Figure it seems that representatives from districts on the Democrat side of the 50% threshold have ADA
scores that are almost 50 points higher than representatives from districts on the Republican side. A second
striking feature of Figure 2 is the apparent lack of correlation between vote share and the ADA score.
Democrats (Republicans) who barely won their districts subsequently have voting records that are just as
liberal (conservative) as their fellow members who won their electoral races by landslides.
The key identifying assumption in our analysis is that as one compares closer and closer elections,
all pre-determined characteristics of Republican and Democrat districts (including the district-speciﬁcb l i s s
points) become more and more similar. We provide two pieces of evidence to supportthis assumption. First,
in the bottom panel of Figure 2, we plot the ADA scores from the Congressional sessions that preceded the
determination of the Democratic two-party vote share. If our identifying assumption is correct, we should
observe no discontinuity in the relationship between lagged ADA scores (which are already determined
before the assignment of the “treatment”) and the vote share. If, on the contrary, the jump in the top panel
is spurious, then we would expect to observe a jump in the lagged ADA scores. The lack of discontinuity
lends some credibility to our identifying assumption.23
As a second speciﬁcation check, we show that as we compare closer and closer elections, Re-
publican and Democrat districts have other similar pre-determined characteristics. Consider, for example,
22 The discontinuity estimated by pooling all the years in Figure 2 masks some variation in the discontinuity gap across states and
years. This is not surprising, as the political science literature, for example, has noted that in the South, Democrats and Republicans
are ideologically closer than they are in the North. We have estimated the discontinuity by decade and by region. When we stratify
by decade, we ﬁnd that the estimated discontinuity is relatively smaller during the 1970s, and relatively larger during the 1990s.
When we stratify by region and decade, the discontinuity is relatively smaller in the South in the 1950s and 1970s.
23 The estimated gap is 3.5 (5.6).
24geographical location. There are sizable geographical differences in the full sample. Democrats are signiﬁ-
cantly more likely to be elected in the South than in the North and the West. However, as we start restricting
the sample to closer and closer elections, the geographical differences decrease. For elections that are only
within two percentage points from the threshold, the differences are not statistically signiﬁcant.
This is shown in Figures 3 and 4, which plot district characteristics against vote share. Other than
geographical location, we consider the following pre-determined characteristics: real income, percentage
with high school degree, percentage black, percentage eligible to vote, and size of the voting population.24
Generally, the ﬁgures indicate that the magnitude of the discontinuity around the 50% threshold is small.25
Overall, we conclude that in a close neighborhood of 50% Republican and Democrat districts have similar
pre-determined characteristics, lending credibility to our main identifying assumption.
4.3 Partial Convergence versus Full Divergence under Homogeneity
The size of the discontinuity in ADA scores documented in Figure 2 is more precisely quantiﬁed in Table
1. All the entries in the table are based on close elections. Speciﬁcally, we include only districts with
Democrat vote share at time t − 1 between 48% and 52%: 48% <VS t−1 < 52%.
There are 915 such districts. We begin, in column 1, by reporting the coefﬁcient on DEMt in a
regression of ADAt on DEMt, including only districts in which the vote share in the previous election is
between 48% and 52%. The estimated coefﬁcient is 48.8.
Column 2 reports an estimate of Equation 8. Speciﬁcally, it shows the RD estimate in a regression
of ADAt−1 on DEMt−1. The mean difference in ADA scores at time t − 1 between Democrat and
Republican representatives that were elected in close elections is 47.6. This estimate corresponds to the
magnitude of the discontinuity documented in the top panel of Figure 2. In the framework proposed in
Section 3, such a large difference is a strong rejection of the full convergence hypothesis.
Having found evidence inconsistent with full convergence – the ﬁndings of other empirical studies
24 Data on districts characteristics in each election year are from the last available Census of Population. Because the census takes
place every ten years, standard errors allow for clustering at the district-decade level.
25 One exception is the percentage blacks, for which the magnitude of the discontinuity is statistically signiﬁcant. This is due to
few outliers in the outer part of the vote share range. When the polynomial is estimated including only districts with vote share
between 25% and 75%, the coefﬁcients becomes insigniﬁcant.
25– we turn to the question of whether the equilibrium can be best described as complete divergence or
partial convergence. In Section 3, we illustrate that a way to distinguish between full divergence and partial
divergence is to analyze the effect of an exogenous change in the probability of victory of a candidate.
Under full divergence, we should observe little change in the candidates’ policy positions. Under partial
divergence, candidates should move toward their bliss points if facing an exogenously higher probability
of winning. We empirically implement this test by using the party that wins the election at time t − 1 as
an instrument for the party that wins at time t, conditioning on close elections at time t − 1.A s s h o w n
in Proposition 3 above, under the null hypothesis of full divergence, RD-IV estimates are consistent and
should be similar to the RD estimates shown in column 2 of Table 1. Under the alternative hypothesis of
partial divergence, RD-IV estimates are not consistent and are likely to exceed RD estimates in magnitude.
We begin by graphically showing the “ﬁrst stage regresion” in the top panel of Figure 5, which
plots DEMt against VS t−1. The large discontinuity around the 50% threshold conﬁrms that there exists
a causal incumbency advantage, as documented in Lee (2001,2002). For representatives who were elected
in close elections at time t − 1, such an incumbency advantage translates into an exogenous change in the
probability of election at time t, which we use to distinguish between full divergence and partial divergence.
The effect is quantiﬁed in column 3 of Table 1, which suggests that the ﬁrst stage coefﬁcient is 0.48.
We now report the reduced-form estimates. In column 4, we show the coefﬁcient on DEMt−1 in a
regression of ADAt on DEMt−1. The estimated coefﬁcient is 21.2. The same effect is shown graphically
in the bottom panel of Figure 5, which plots ADA scores at time t − 1 against vote share in t − 1.
Finally, we turn to the RD-IV estimator described in Section 3.2.2. The estimate in column 4 is
43.9, slightly smaller than the RD estimate in column 2. As the RD-IV and RD estimates are quite similar,
we cannot reject the hypothesis of full divergence.
4.4 Differentiating Between Convergence, Complete divergence and Partial
Divergence Under Heterogeneity
In the previous section, we tested the hypothesis of full divergence against the hypothesis of partial con-
vergence under the assumption of homogeneity. We now turn to a more general framework where the
26difference between the parties’ positions vary across districts and legislatures. Again, we focus on the 915
districts that experience close elections at time t − 1.
We divide this group of districts in three sub-groups, based on the vote share at time t, according to
the rules speciﬁed in Proposition 4. Strong Democrat districts include districts where a Republican (barely)
won at time t − 1 but a Democrat regained the district at time t. Strong Democrat districts also include the
districts with the largest Democrat vote shares at time t, among the districts where a Democrat won at time
t−1.26 There are 224 such districts. In the terminology of Angrist, Imbens and Rubin (1995) these districts
are “always takers”, because irrespective of the quasi-random assignment of DEMt−1, they are Democrat
at time t. Under complete divergence, we expect the ADA scores of representatives from strong Democrat
districts at time t to be unaffected by who wins the election at time t − 1. Under partial convergence, a
Democratic victory in t − 1 should cause ADA scores to rise for this sub-population.
Similarly, strong Republican districts include those where a Democrat (barely) won at time t − 1
but a Republican regained the district at time t, as well as districts with the largest Republican vote shares
at time t, among the districts where a Republican won at time t − 1.27 T h e r ea r e2 5 0s u c hd i s t r i c t s .
These districts could be called “never takers” (Angrist, Imbens, Rubin (1995)), because irrespective of the
“random assignment” of DEMt−1,t h e ya r eR e p u b l i c a na tt i m et. Again, under complete divergence, we
expect the ADA scores of representatives from strong Republican districts at timet to be unaffected by who
win the elections at time t−1. Under partial convergence, a Democratic victory in t−1 should cause ADA
scores to rise for this sub-population.
Finally, we call the remaining districts swing districts. The swing districts are marginal districts
that are neither safely Republican nor safely Democrat. They are districts who switched from Republican
to Democratic control in t because of a Democratic victory in t − 1. For these districts, under complete
divergence, the impact of a Democratic victory at time t−1 should on ADA scores should be similar to the
26 Speciﬁcally, we included the top 24.18% districts with the largest democrat vote share among the districts where a democrat
won at time t − 1. The reason why we included the top 24.18 districts is that among all the districts where the democrat lost at
time t − 1, the democrat candidate won at time t in 24.18% of the cases. Because there is ”random assignment” at time t-1, the
probability of winning the elections at time t for a democrat candidate irrespective of the outcome at time t-1 should be the same.
27 Speciﬁcally, we included the 27.39% districts with the largest republican vote share, since among all the districts where the
republican lost at time t − 1, the republican candidate won at time t in 27.39% of the cases.
27average difference between the two parties’ positions. There are 441 swing districts.
In the bottom part of Table 1 we report separate estimates for the three groups. Column 2 shows
the coefﬁcients from regressions of ADAt−1 on DEMt−1 for the three groups. The estimates are 52.1 for
strong Democrat districts, 49.6 for swing districts and 44.4 for strong Republican districts. This suggests
that the RD estimate of Equation 8 does not vary signiﬁcantly across the three groups.
The key results are shown in column 4, where we regress ADAt on DEMt−1. The coefﬁcients
for strong Democrat districts and strong Republican districts are not statistically different from zero. The
coefﬁcient for swing districts is the only one different from zero. Importantly, it is very similar to the RD
coefﬁcient in column 2. Based on the discussion in Section 3, these results strongly suggest the data are
more consistent with full divergence.
4.5 Sensitivity to Alternative Measures of Voting Records
The empirical results are not speciﬁc to the ADA scores. We now show that the ﬁndings presented so far
are similar when we use alternative measures of representatives’ voting records.
Figure 6 is analogous to the top panel in Figure 2, but instead of using ADA scores, it is based on
McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal’s DW-NOMINATE scores (top panel) and the percent of votes cast that are
equal to the vote cast by the Democrat party leader (bottom panel). The Figure indicates that, similar to the
ADA scores, there is a large discontinuity at 50% of the vote share for both the DW-NOMINATE scores
and the roll-call agreement with the Democrat party leader.
Tables 2 and 3 quantify the magnitude of the discontinuity and reports RD-IV estimates. All the
qualitative results of Table 1 hold up using these measures. When we use the DW-NOMINATE scores,
the RD estimate is 0.56, remarkably close to the RD-IV estimate in column 5, which is 0.58. A pattern
similar to the results for the ADA scores emerges in the bottom panel of Table 2, when the heterogeneous
model is estimated. The effects of RCt on DEMt−1 are virtually zero for strong Democrat and Republican
districts, as would be predicted by full divergence. The reduced-form coefﬁcient for the swing districts is
0.60, remarkably similar to the RD estimate in column 2. A similar story emerges from Table 3, where we
28use the percent of votes cast that are in agreement with the Democrat party leader.
We now examine whether our results are robust when we use ratings from different interest groups.
We have collected ratings from several liberal and conservative interest groups. Liberal groups include:
American Civil Liberties Union, the League of Women Voters, the League of Conservation Voters, the
American Federation of Government Employees, the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal
Employees, the American Federation of Teachers , the AFL-CIO Building and Construction, the United
Auto Workers. Conservative groups include: the Conservative Coalition , the U.S. Chamber of Commerce,
the American Conservative Union, and the Christian Voice.
These alternative ratings yield results that are qualitatively similar to the results presented so far.
Figures 7 to 10 show the relationship between ratings and the democrat vote share. All the ratings range
from 0 to 100. For liberal groups, low ratings correspond to conservative roll call votes, and high ratings
correspond to liberal roll call votes. For conservative groups, the opposite is true. In all cases, we ﬁnd a
large discontinuity at 50% of the vote share. This ﬁnding is analogous to what we document in Figure 6
for nominate scores and probability of voting like the Democrat party leader. With all the measures we
could ﬁnd, we ﬁnd a large discontinuity at the 50 percent threshold, but a generally ﬂat relation between the
voting score and the Democratic vote share elsewhere. Democrats (Republicans) who won elections by a
large margin do not vote systematically different from Democrats (Republicans) who won by slim margins.
In Figure 11, we turn to the comparison of RD estimates and RD-IV estimates for each of these
alternative interest group ratings. Instead of presenting these results in a table format as we did in Tables 1
to 3, we present the main results in a graphical form. The ﬁgure plots the RD estimates against the RD-IV
estimates for each group. The diagonal is the 45o degree line. Most estimates are on the line or close
to the line, indicating again that across a variety of different interest groups scores, the results are highly
consistent with the full divergence hypothesis.
Similarresultsareobtainedfromtheratingsthatweconstructedbasedonrollcallvotesonabortion.
Just to give an example, Figure 12 shows a pattern similar to the one uncovered for ADA scores in Figure
2. This provides evidence that the discontinuity documented in Figure 2 is not simply a consequence of
29partisan criteria used by ADA.
5 Relation to Previous Empirical Studies
Previous empirical studies have examined the extent to which party afﬁliation and constituents’
preferences inﬂuence roll call voting behavior.28 Most studies conclude that political party afﬁliation is
an important predictor of voting behavior. Poole and Rosenthal (1984), for example, show that senators
from the same state belonging to different parties have signiﬁcantly different voting records. More recently,
Snyder and Groseclose (2000) estimate the effect of party afﬁliation on roll call votes using an innovative
identiﬁcation strategy based on lopsided votes. Their main concern is that the correlation between party
afﬁliation and voting may be spurious, possibly reﬂecting legislators’ or constituency preferences. Their
strategy is based on the assumption that on votes with 65 percent or more legislators on one side, legislators
arenotsubjecttopartyinﬂuence. Theyconcludethatinthemajorityofcases, partyafﬁliationisasigniﬁcant
determinant of roll calls.29 In a study of Senatorial voting behavior Levitt (1996) also ﬁnds that political
party is a key determinant of roll-call voting behavior, and that constituents’ preferences are assigned a
smaller weight in senator utility functions.30
The agreement between these ﬁndings and our quasi-experimental results on the issue of full con-
vergence suggest that the previous literature’s ﬁndings are not simply artifacts of selection bias. In particu-
lar, with the beneﬁt of hindsight, our own analysis in Figures 2, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 12 reveals that a simple
difference in means would not have been a particularly biased estimate of the effect of party afﬁliation on
roll call votes.
On the other hand, the existing literature does not directly address the main question that we focus
on in this paper: whether roll call voting behavior in Congress is best described as a partial convergence or
28 An example of early empirical work in this area is Miller and Stokes (1963).
29 See Krehbiel (2000) and McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal (2000) for a different interpretation of the Snyder and Groseclose
results.
30 The literature is too large to be summarized here. Other examples include, but are not limited to, Poole and Rosenthal (1996),
Snyder and Ting (2001a), Fiorina (1999), Poole and Rosenthal (2001), Snyder and Ting (2001b), Lott and Davis (1992), Canes-
Wrone, Brady and Cogan (2000), Krehbiel (2000), Bender (1991), Lott (1990), McArthur and Marks (1988), Douglas and Siel-
berger (1987), McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal (2000).
30complete policy divergence equilibrium. For example, in Levitt (1996), it is presumed that the Senator is
making a trade-off between voters preferences and his own ideology, and the presumption that the marginal
conditions are met for an “interior solution” is what justiﬁes the ﬁxed effects regression analysis. This is
useful for estimating parameters of the implied utility function, but this approach is not informative about
whether the equilibrium is an “interior” or “corner” solution in the ﬁrst place. Indeed, in the dynamic
framework of Alesina (1988), it is clear that the per-period ﬁrst-order conditions are not met in the fully
divergent equilibrium.31
6C o n c l u s i o n
Existing empirical studies on Congressional voting behavior typically show evidence strictly in-
consistent with the complete policy convergence outcome. However, it would seem premature to reject the
notion that electoral competition compels politicians to moderate their positions on the basis of rejecting
the stark outcome of complete policy convergence. Indeed, the outcome of complete policy convergence
may be too stark an equilibrium to be “realistic”. Thus, an appropriate assessment of the ability of electoral
competition to induce any degree of “compromise” rests on being able to empirically differentiate between
partial policy convergence and complete policy divergence.
Within a fairly general theoretical framework, this paper empirically tests the bold prediction of the
complete policy divergence hypothesis – that exogenous changes in the relative popularity of the candidates
has no impact on the candidates’ positions. We overcome the problem of not being able to directly measure
the losing candidates’ positions and as well as the parties’ bliss points, which potentially vary across Con-
gressional districts. We do so by exploiting the near-random assignment of party control of the seat that
occurs among elections that turn out to be closely contested. Within the context of roll call voting behavior
in the U.S. House, our RD estimates strongly reject the full policy convergence hypothesis, a ﬁnding con-
sistent with the existing literature. More importantly, our RD-IV estimates provide no systematic evidence
of partial convergence, and are strongly consistent with the sharp predictions of the complete divergence
31 When the ﬁrst order conditions are met, Alesina’s equation (6) holds, but the complete divergence equilibrium is in general
different.
31equilibrium. Within the theoretical framework that we utilize, this ﬁnding is strictly inconsistent with the
notion that politicians are able to make binding pre-commitments to policies (which generally leads to
partial policy convergence).
It is important to realize that our results do not neccearily constitute a rejection of the overall “rep-
resentativeness” of Congress. For example, one can deﬁne “representativeness” as the degree to which a
politician represents the preferences of his/her core supporters. Our analysis would say nothing about this
degree of representativeness. In loose terms, we have no way of knowing whether the Democratic (Repub-
lican) bliss point is exactly coincident with the most-preferred policy choice of the “median” Democratic
(Republican) voter. It is possible that electoral competition in the U.S. primary system can work to force
each party’s nominee to represent the median voter within the party. Instead, our analysis takes the bliss
points – representative or not – as given, and asks whether electoral competition compels politicians to
deviate from those bliss points.
We also emphasize that since our analysis focuses on the voting behavior of representatives in the
U.S. House, our ﬁndings may not generalize to other bodies of elected government, or to other measures
of politician behavior (other than roll call voting behavior). In principle, the type of analysis presented
here could be applied to contexts such as the U.S. Senate, or the state legislatures in the U.S., as well
as the analysis of other dimensions of politician behavior. It may be true, for example, that electoral
competition may have a greater inﬂuence on moderating the positions of opposing candidates in races
for seats to state legislative assemblies. Although our analysis may not readily generalize to these other
contexts, we nonetheless believe that if reputational mechanisms are able to sustain a certain degree of
policy convergence, the U.S. House may be an ideal setting in which to observe this phenomenon. This
is because the frequency of elections to the U.S. House, the absence of term-limits, the long tenures that
we observe in the Congress, are all reasons why the force of reputational mechanisms should be relatively
strong in the House. Furthermore, our analysis focuses on relatively “balanced” districts (closely contested
elections), where it is (theoretically) easier to sustain convergent equilibria.
Itisimportanttorecognizethatourinterpretation oftheﬁndingsdependonacceptingthetheoretical
32framework of Alesina (1988), which assumes, among other things, that voters are forward-looking and
have rational expectations, that the two-party system is taken as given, that bliss points are exogenously
pre-determined, that parties’ objective functions are concave, and that all other things equal, a candidate
can gain votes by moving his position closer to his/her opponent. Undoubtedly, making bliss points or the
number of parties endogenous will make this issue more difﬁcult to empirically examine, and may require
different deﬁnitions of the notions of full and partial convergence, and full policy divergence. However,
we maintain that until empirical analysis of an even more general framework is feasible, the framework of
Alesina (1988) is useful for empirical analysis because 1) it has limited number of unobservable exogenous
factors, 2) it makes a clear distinction between the full and partial convergence and full divergence, and
most importantly, 3) it explicitly generates testable predictions that allow one to differentiate between the
three types of equilibria.
Our empirical analysis suggests that there is little evidence that representatives in the U.S. House
alter their positions (in either direction) in response to a large exogenous change in the probability of win-
ning an election. While the degree of “reputation” and “ability to pre-commit” are not directly measurable,
we believe that a leading explanation for our empirical ﬁndings is that the difﬁculty of establishing credible
commitments to policies is an important real-world phenomenon. Thus, the assumption that politicians are
unable to overcome this credibility problem, which has been adopted in more recent models of representa-
tive democracy (e.g. Besley and Coate 1997, 1998), appears to have some empirical support.
33Appendix A.
Comparative Statics in the one-shot Nash Equilibrium (with binding pre-commitments)
Considerw1 andw2 inaone-periodgame, whereeachpartyisabletomakebindingpre-commitments
to policies, and chooses the optimal position given its (correct) expectation of its opponents’ position. Let
P = F (φ),w h e r eφ = β1δ − β2 (x + y),w i t hβ1,β2 > 0 (which captures the notion that an increase in δ
leads to an increase in the probability that party 1 will win, and that, when x>y , movements toward more
moderate positions will raise the probability of winning the election) and F (·) is a cdf corresponding to a
probability density f (·).L e tλ(·)=
f(·)
F(·) and λ∗ (·)=
f(·)
1−F(·). We show below that if 1) U (·) and V (·) are
concave(asassumedin thetext), 2)f (·)is symmetric around (without loss of generality) 0,3 )λ0 (·) < 0 for
all real values (which would be the case if f (·) were a normal density, for example), 4) reaction functions
are negatively sloped, and 5) we are considering an “interior” Nash equilibrium (c2 <y<x<c 1), then





To see this, note that the Nash equilibrium is characterized by the two ﬁrst-order conditions (with





V (y)−V (x) =0 . Concavity of U and V and λ0 (·) < 0 (which implies, given
symmetry of f (·) λ∗0 (·) > 0) implies that the second order conditions for a maximum hold: G1
x (x,y,δ),
G2
y (x,y,δ) < 0.
Inorderforreactionfunctions tobenegatively sloped, itmustbethatG1
y (x,y,δ),G 2
x (x,y,δ) < 0.
Negatively sloped reaction functions imply that the closer party 2’s position is to party 1’s position, party
1’s optimal choice moves closer to party 2’s position. The closer party 2’s position is to its bliss point, the
closer is party 1’s optimal choice to party 1’s bliss point. This is an intuitive assumption that captures the
notion of the Downsian notion of electoral competition, except that parties care about the policy as well. In
order for G1







dy < 0 (and similarly for G2
x (x,y,δ))w h e r e
the second term can be shown to be positive. Therefore, β2 must be sufﬁciently high to make the reaction
34function negatively sloped. Note that if a party cares about the policy only if they win the election (and get
a constant level of utility that does not vary with the policy if they lose), as long as β2 is positive, reaction
functions will be negatively sloped.
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∗0(φ) . This inequality holds because the
left-hand side is positive and the right side is negative (due to concavity of V (·)) .I nt h es a m ew a yi tc a nb e













Thus, under these conditions, an exogenous increase in the relative popularity of party 1 (an in-
crease in δ) leads to both candidates moving towards party 1’s bliss point.
Proof of Proposition 1 Denote the joint density of VS it,c 1it, c2it,a n dδit as g(vs,c1,c 2,δ) and
the density of VS it as h(vs). g(vs,c1,c 2,δ) is continuous with respect to it arguments because vs is a
continuous function with respect to its arguments, and c1it, c2it, δit,a n dεit has continuous joint density
by assumption. For the same reasons, h is also continuous with respect to vs.T h u s
g(vs,c1,c2,δ)
h(vs) is contin-
uous. See DiNardo and Lee (2002) and Lee (2002) to see how the result holds even if the heterogeneous
components (c1it,c 2it,δit)h a v eﬁnite and discrete support, and only εit has continuous density.
Proof of Proposition 4 Condition on “close elections” in t − 1. Consider the sub-population
DEMit−1 =0 ,DEM it =1 . ClearlytheybelongtothegroupSTRONGDEM,byd eﬁnition(DEMit−1 =
0,DEM it =0donot). Weneedtoshowthat,toaﬁrst-orderapproximation,forthepopulationDEMit−1 =
1, Democrats would have won even if DEMit−1 =0 , if and only if VS it > 1
2+ θ1.
Considerthe“voteproductionfunction”, inequilibriumVS it =vs(x(c1it,c 2it,δit),y(c1it,c 2it,δit),
δit, εit). Taking a linear approximation to this function around the equilibrium yields (normalizing all co-
35efﬁcients to 1) VS it ≈− c1it − c2it + δit + εit. Furthermore, given Proposition 2, we can decompose δit
so that VS it ≈− c1it − c2it + γDEMit−1 + δ∗
it + εit.N o w ,θ1 is deﬁn e ds ot h a tPr[−c1it −c2it + δ∗
it +
εit > 1
2 ]=P r [ −c1it − c2it + γ + δ∗
it + εit > 1
2 + θ1] which implies that θ1 = γ. This implies that for
DEMit−1 =1 , −c1it − c2it + δ∗
it + εit > 1
2 if and only if VS it > 1
2 + θ1.
A similar argument holds for the STRONGREP and SWINGdistricts.
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Data Appendix
T h ee l e c t i o nd a t au s e di no u ra n a l y s i sc o m e sf r o mI C P S RS t u d y6 3 1 1“ E l e c t i o n st ot h eU n i t e d
States House of Representatives, 1898-1992,” compiled by Gary King. ICPSR 6311 reports the state, dis-
trict, incumbency status, and the total votes received by the Republican and Democrat candidates. ICPSR
6311 has the advantage that King distinguishes between “normal” elections that can be characterized
as a Republican running against a Democrat, with no important independent candidates, and all other
elections labeled as “exceptions.” We drop the 304 “exceptions” between 1946 and 1992 leaving 10,138
observations—roughly 422 observations per congressional session from 1946 to 1992. The 1994 election
data was obtained from the U.S. House of Representatives’ Ofﬁce of the Clerk’s website.
The “abortion” voting score outlined in Section 4.1 and the percentage of votes that agreed with
the Democratic leader were obtained from ICPSR Study 4 “United States Congressional Roll Call Voting
Records.” After creating these scores as described in the text, we merged ICPSR 4 by state, district and
congressional session onto 6311. A small random sample was drawn after the merge and checked against
published sources to verify that the merge had worked correctly.
The Americans for Democratic Action interest group ratings were taken from Timothy J. Grose-
close’s website. As mentioned in the text, we use “adjusted” ADA scores to be able to compare ratings
across sessions of congress. See Groseclose, Levitt, and Snyder (1999) for a description of the procedure
used to calculate the “adjusted” ADA scores. We replicated the analysis in the paper with the “nominal”
ADA scores and found no qualitative difference in our ﬁndings.
Congressional District Data for 1962-1970 was taken from ICPSR Study 10 “United States Con-
gressional District Data Books.” Congressional District Data for 1972-1980 was taken from ICPSR Study
11 “United States Congressional District Data Book for the Ninety-Third Congress.” Congressional District
Data for 1982-1990 was taken from ICPSR Study 8710 “Census of Population and Housing, 1980 [United
States]: STF3D Congressional District-level Extract.” Congressional District Data for 1992 was taken from
37the 1990 Congressional District level extract. All districts during a given decade were assigned the most
recent census value. For example, 1974 congressional districts were assigned the 1970 census values.
Keith T. Poole’s website provided much of the data used in this paper. The non-ADA interest
group ratings came from Poole and Daniels’ (1985) interest group rating data which contains 59 interest
group ratings scores, each covering some or all of the years between 1959 and 1981. McCarty, Poole and
Rosenthal’sDW-NOMINATEscoresandPoole’srank ordering datawerealsofoundat Poole’swebsite. For
a description of the NOMINATE procedure see Poole and Rosenthal (1997), and for a speciﬁc description
of the DW-NOMINATE scores see McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal (1997) and for a description of the rank
order procedure see Poole (1999).
James Snyder was kind enough to provide us with the Presidential Election returns by Congres-
sional District from 1952 to 1996 for a previous draft of this paper.
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